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Abstract
This paper explores the problem of non-convex labor supply deci-
sions in an economy with both private and public sector jobs. To this 
end, Hansen (1985) and Rogerson’s (1988) indivisible-hours frame-
work is extended to an environment featuring a double discrete labor 
choice. The novelty of the study is that the micro-founded representa-
tion obtained from explicit aggregation over homogeneous individu-
als features different disutility of labor across the two sectors, which 
is in line with the observed difference in average wage rates (OECD 
2011). Therefore, this theory-based utility function could be utilized 
to study labor supply responses over the business cycle.
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1. Introduction
In the standard real business cycle model, as Cooley and Prescott (1995) have 
pointed out, changes in hours account for two-thirds of the cyclical output volatil-
ity. Those hours, however, are assumed to be supplied in the private sector only, 
and thus the private-public sector labor choice is ignored. This study adds to the 
literature by distinguishing between the two types of hours: after all, central gov-
ernments in EU countries are the biggest employers at a national level, and public 
employment is a significant share of total employment. This paper goes one step 
further and focuses on the fact that workers work full-time and only very rarely 
move between public and/or private sector. Thus, the non-convexities (either work 
a full week on a job, or not work at all) in both sectors are taken seriously, and 
the study will try to uncover whether those features could produce interesting ef-
fects on the European labor markets. In particular, this ”double indivisibility” of 
hours could provide new implications for the economy’s behavior over the busi-
ness cycle. Following Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), this paper utilizes their 
approach by considering the effect of indivisibilities/non-convexities in both the 
private and public sector labor market. Using explicit aggregation, the resulting 
utility representation features constant, but different disutility of labor in the two 
sectors. This is an important finding, as it could easily accommodate the differ-
ent wage rates observed in data. Such a micro-founded representation featuring 
a wedge between hours worked in the private vs. hours supplied in the public sec-
tor could be useful in future macroeconomic studies dealing with the propagation 
of business cycle fluctuations, as well as models dealing with fiscal policy effects 
working through the labor markets.
A side result of the aggregation procedure is to demonstrate that the represen-
tation used in Linnemann (2009), which is claimed to be derived using Hansen’s 
(1985) indivisible hours setup, holds true only for a very special case. Hansen 
(1985), however, presents a model with one-sector, while Linnemann (2009) uses 
a model with two sectors: private and public. With two distinct labor markets, 
there are going to be two discrete decisions, so we need two different lotteries 
to convexify the two distinct hours decision sets. The implicit assumption used 
in Linnemann (2009) is that households decide on the sector of the economy in 
which to enter, and then conditional on the sector, decide whether to supply a fixed 
amount of hours, or none. Without proof, Linnemann (2009) claims that the result-
ing aggregate utility function is as below
(1)
where, , and  denote aggregate private consumption, 
government services, private hours, public hours and total hours, respectively.
In US data, the steady state hours for the two sectors are different, and that is 
the data Linnemann (2009) uses to calibrate his model. This creates an internal 
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inconsistency within his own model, and with a single wage rate in the setup, this 
also leads to indeterminacy of total hours. The indeterminacy is due to the fact that 
given the assumed common wage in the two sectors, and the equal disutility of 
work across sectors, additional information is needed to provide the split of hours 
between the two sectors.1 Linnemann (2009) solves this problem by assuming that 
public employment follows a stochastic process. We will show that given the cali-
bration used in the original paper, the disutility of an hour work in the two sectors 
will not be equal in the general case. In addition, the setup in this paper will feature 
endogenous public sector supply of labor hours. Thus, in order to close the model 
wage rate in the two sectors need to be different, which is in line with the stylized 
facts in both the US and major EU economies.
2. Model Setup
The theoretical setup is a static economy without physical capital, where agents 
face a non-convex decision in a two-sector economy.2 Since the focus is on a one-
period world, the model abstracts away from technological progress, population 
growth and uncertainty. There is a large number of identical one-member house-
holds, indexed by i and distributed uniformly on the [0, 1] interval. The house-
holds will be assigned a sector “type”, and after the type is revealed, each one 
decides whether to work in that sector or not. In the exposition below, we will use 
small case letters to denote individual variables and suppress the index i to save 
on notation.
2.1. Households
Each household maximizes the following utility function
(2)
Where:
(3)
and  denote aggregate private consumption, consumption of the public 
1   The optimality condition from the firm problem is not enough, we also need an optimality con-
dition determining labor demand, i.e. a government choosing employment to balance the budget 
constraint.
2   Adding physical capital accumulation decision and a dynamic structure to the model is then 
straightforward. Also, the absence of those elements in the current analysis does not affect in any 
major way the derivation of the optimality conditions characterizing the aggregate labor supply 
decisions.
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good, hours worked in the private sector, and hours worked in the government sec-
tor. The parameter α ˃ 1 measures the relative weight of leisure in the utility func-
tion. Total consumption  is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggrega-
tion of private consumption and consumption of government services, where η ˃ 0 
measures the degree of substitutablity between the two types of consumption.3
Each household is endowed with one unit of time that can be allocated to work 
in the private sector, work in the government sector, or leisure
(4)
The novelty is that the labor supply is discrete  
. As in Gomes (2015), looking for a job will follow a “directed 
search” process: each household decides in each period whether to go to the public 
or to the provide sector (or, alternatively, is assigned a “sector type”). This process 
is stochastic and has two realization. The probability of going into the private sec-
tor (or being a “private-sector type”) is
(5)
where uppercase letter denote aggregate quantities, i.e.  denotes aggregate hours 
in the private sector, and  are the aggregate hours worked in the public sector. 
Then the probability of being a public sector type is
(6)
This process is i.i.d. accros individuals, so the Law of Large Numbers holds: at 
the aggregate level q share of the households will be private sector type , 
and 1− q share will be public sector type . Once a particular sector is 
chosen, each household decodes on its labor supply. Note that the setup is quite 
general and allows for different wage rates per hour worked in the two sectors.
In addition to the work income households hold shares in the private firm and 
receive profit share π, with .4 Income is subject to a lump-sum tax t, 
where . Therefore, each household’s budget constraint is
(7)
Households act competitively by taking the wage rates , aggregate 
outcomes  and lump-sum taxes  as given. Each household choos-
es  to maximize (2) s.t. (3)−(7).
3   The separability of consumption and leisure is not a crucial assumption for the results that follow. 
A more general, non-separable, utility representation, does not generate new results, while signifi-
cantly complicates the algebraic derivations, and thus interferes with model tractability.
4   This assumption guarantees a positive consumption to either of the two types, even if they choose 
not to work in their sector.
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3. Firms
Next, there is a single firm producing a homogeneous final consumption good, 
which uses labor as an only input. The production function is given by
(8),
where the last assumption is imposed to proxy capacity constraint.
The firm acts competitively by taking the hourly wage rate , aggregate out-
comes  and policy variable  as given. Accordingly,  is chosen 
to maximize static aggregate profit5
(9).
4. Government
There is also a government sector in this economy. The public authority hires em-
ployees to provide the public services. The technology of the public good provi-
sion use labor  as an input, which is remunerated at a non-competitive wage rate 
. Parameter  will measure the fixed gross mark-up of government 
sector wage rate over the private sector one.6 Government production function is 
as follows:
(10)
Where the last assumption guarantees that not all “public-sector types” will 
work in the production of the public good.7 In addition, the public good is a pure 
non-market output, thus it will not appear in the government budget constraint. The 
public sector wage bill is financed by levying a lump-sum tax T on all households
(11).
In terms of fiscal instruments available at the government’s disposal, the gov-
ernment takes total public sector hours, , as given and sets the public sector 
wage rate, , as a fixed mark-up above the competitive wage rate. In a sense, the 
government faces a supply curve for labor in the public sector and determines the 
demand for government employees. Lump-sum taxes will be residually chosen 
5   This representation can be viewed as being isomorphic to a problem in which capital has already 
been optimized over.
6   Such a mark-up is stylized fact for the major EU economies.
7   The level of government services increases households’ utility, hence marginal utility matters.
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to guarantee the budget is balanced.
5. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
Given the choice of T, a DCE is defined by allocations {cp, cg, hp, hg, S}, wage rates 
{wp, wg}, and firm’s profit π s.t. (i) all the households maximize utility; (ii) the pri-
vate firm maximizes profit; (iii) the government budget constraint is balanced; (vi) 
all the markets are clear.
Characterizing the DCE: conditional on a sector, everyone doing the same – 
working or not working – is not equilibrium.
Proof: Case (1): For any positive and finite wage, i.e. 0 < wj < ∞, both sectors 
will want to hire a bit of labor. Hence, hj = 0, j = p, g cannot be equilibrium because 
firm will have a positive labor demand for any finite wage, and households will 
have zero consumption, cj =0, j = p, q, which is ruled out as an optimal choice from 
the monotonicity of the logarithmic utility.8
Case (2): hj = j, j = p, q only if wj = 0, j = p, q which follows form the as-
sumption on both production technologies. At such wage rates both the firm and 
government will want to hire everyone, but no household will want to supply any 
labor. Thus having everyone working is not optimal either. QED
Hence, if there is a DCE, it must be that in equilibrium not everyone will get 
the same private consumption. Still, everyone consumes the same level of public 
goods, as it is assumed to be non-excludable and non-rivalrous. The households 
that work will have higher utility of private consumption, while those which do not 
work will enjoy more utility form leisure. Lastly, every household belonging to the 
same type will enjoy the same level of total utility.
Therefore, we will consider an equilibrium in which λp of the people who 
go to the private sector, and λg of the people who go to the public sector work 
0 < λp + λg < 1. Thus, Hp = λp p, and Hg = λg g.
From the firm’s optimization problem we obtain the expression for the com-
petitive hourly wage
(12)
Hence, there will be positive economic profits amounting to
(13)
which follow from the assumption that the production function features decreasing 
returns to scale. Next, equilibrium government output is
(14),
8  If nobody works π = 0 as well.
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and lump-sum tax revenue equals
(15).
Now we will show the existence of a unique pair by analyzing a system of two 
non-linear equations. Those equations use the equality of utility of those who work 
and those who do not in the same sector. Households in the private sector are indif-
ferent between working or not working:
(16).
Similarly, households in the public sector are indifferent between working or not
(17).
Substitute out the public sector wage rate with its equivalent expression form 
the government budget constraint
(18).
Then do the same for the lump-sum taxes to obtain
(19).
Next, proving existence and uniqueness of optimal (λp, λg) ∈ (0,1) × (0,1) fol-
lows trivially form the Brower’s Fixed Point and the assumptions on the functional 
forms of utility an d productivity functions.9
Also, observe that consumption of households in the private sector is not equal 
to those in the public sector due to idiosyncratic (“sector-type”) shock in the begin-
ning. Note that there are a lot of equilibria (in terms of the “names” of the people 
working), all of them with the same fraction of population λp working in the private 
sector, and λg working in the public sector.
Let  denote the private consumption of individuals that work 
and those who do not, respectively, in each sector with . Be-
cause of the presence of the public good and non-convexities, the First Welfare 
theorem does not hold, so this equilibrium is not PO. The Social Planner (SP) can 
9   This theorem states that if a functions is continuous and monotone in its argument, and crosses 
the origin only once, than a unique fixed point exist on the domain over which the argument of the 
function is defined.
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then improve upon the equilibrium by giving in each sector a consumption level 
independent of the fact whether they worked or not, . We for-
mally state this below.
Claim: The allocation  is not efficient, i.e. there is an alternative 
allocation that a SP could choose that can make everyone better off.
Intuitively, the SP randomly chooses a fraction  of individuals to work in 
each sector and give sector-specific consumption . 
We need that the bundle offered by the SP is feasible and makes everyone better 
off.10 Note that there is no perfect risk sharing (insurance) between sector types due 
to idiosyncratic shock in the beginning.
Proof: Showing feasibility is trivial because
(20).
Similarly
(21).
Next, it will be shown that the new allocation constitutes a Pareto improve-
ment: SP is giving in expected value something better than the equilibrium alloca-
tion. Household in each sector are made better off.
10   However, in the face of the uninsurable idiosyncratic shock, it is not the best improvement.
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(22)
Where the strict inequality in (22) follows form the concavity of the logarith-
mic function and the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregation of total 
consumption.
In conclusion, we can do better than the equilibrium allocation (we know this 
from the presence of the public good, but can improve on the distortion form the 
discrete labor supply decision) if we allow the Social Planner to randomize al-
locations, or offer employment lotteries. Thus, , then . 
Similarly, , then . Then, using that  and 
, aggregate utility function becomes
(23)
Substitute out the expression for  and drop the ln (1) terms to obtain
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(24)
Let  and , where  are con-
stants. Then
(25).
Finally, assume that households are able to pool together their resources and 
equalize consumption across the two groups, i.e.: .11 Alternatively, 
the government could achieve this through a suitable second round of lump-sum 
taxation. Note that such a redistribution provides a perfect insurance against the 
idiosyncratic “sector-type” shock in the beginning.12 We will thus obtain
(26).
As in Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 
changes (from one to infinity), but there is a different weight on disutility of leisure 
with respect to hours in each sector, i.e. , as long as , which in 
turn implies ,13 hence  which is the case in the 
data set for the US used by Linnemann (2009). He uses steady state public hours 
(normalized) to be 0.16 vs. 0.17 for the hours in the private sector. Note that only 
for the special case when , and , which do not hold in data, 
Linnemann’s (2009) representation, corresponding to a case when , 
will be correct. In a real-business-cycle model, when optimizing over public and 
private employment, and dividing side by side to the two optimality conditions, 
we can obtain
(27).
In OECD (2011) data, the public sector wage features a significant premium, 
e.g.  for Germany, hence . This means that public sector workers 
have a higher disutility of labor, and need a higher reservation wage.
For the general case, which is supported by data (Gomes 2015), the disutility 
11   More precisely, the Social Planner can offer everyone from the two groups a consumption bundle 
. Showing feasibility is trivial, and the outcome that the new bundle will 
be strictly preferred follows form the concave shape of the utility function.
12   Such a redistribution will only be efficient if performed after consumption levels have been equal-
ized across states in both sectors. In particular, this redistribution is implemented once the lotteries 
and insurance markets have exhausted all possible profitable opportunities and have been closed.
13   and  can be interpreted as sector-conditional job finding rates, as in Gomes’s (2015) model 
with search and frictions. Also, in his calibration, .
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of a marginal hour worked in the two sectors will be constant, but different.14 Such 
a setup can now easily accommodate different wage rates across sectors. In addi-
tion, the different weights on the labor supplies was generated endogenously and 
was driven by the different employment shares in the two sectors and the different 
work-weeks.15 This has important policy implications, as variations in total hours 
in data are due to variations in the number of people employed, and not due to vari-
ations in the hours worked per person. However, all this is left on the agenda for 
future research.
6. Conclusions
This paper explored the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an econo-
my with both private and public sector. To this end, Hansen (1985) and Rogerson’s 
(1988) indivisible-hours framework was extended to an environment featuring 
a double discrete labor choice. The novelty of the study was that the microfounded 
representation obtained from explicit aggregation over homogeneous individuals 
features different disutility of labor across the two sectors, which is in line with the 
observed difference in average wage rates (OECD 2011). This theory-based utility 
function could be then utilized to study labor supply responses over the business 
cycle, and produce new implications of the economy’s behavior over the business 
cycle.
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